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Abstract— Unconditionally secure message authentication is an
important part of Quantum Cryptography (QC). We analyze se-
curity effects of using a key obtained from QC for authentication
purposes in later rounds of QC. In particular, the eavesdropper
gains partial knowledge on the key in QC that may have an effect
on the security of the authentication in the later round. Our initial
analysis indicates that this partial knowledge has little effect on
the authentication part of the system, in agreement with previous
results on the issue. However, when taking the full QC protocol
into account, the picture is different. By accessing the quantum
channel used in QC, the attacker can change the message to
be authenticated. This together with partial knowledge of the
key does incur a security weakness of the authentication. The
underlying reason for this is that the authentication used, which
is insensitive to such message changes when the key is unknown,
becomes sensitive when used with a partially known key. We
suggest a simple solution to this problem, and stress usage of
this or an equivalent extra security measure in QC.
Index Terms— Quantum Cryptography, Quantum Key Distri-
bution, Quantum Key Growing, Authentication.
I. INTRODUCTION
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY, or more accuratelyQuantum Key Growing (QKG), uses properties of quan-
tum mechanical systems to share a secret key between two
sites. QKG was first proposed in 1984 [1] and there are several
variations on the theme today [2]–[4]. Since there are excellent
descriptions of these systems elsewhere (e.g., [4]), we will
only outline the generic steps of a QKG algorithm here, and
then focus on the authentication used. The security of QKG
is based on laws of nature [5]–[7] rather than computational
complexity as is usually the case for key-sharing systems [8],
and therefore we will here not assume that there are any
bounds to the computational capacity of the attacker.
We will use common-practice terminology and refer to
the sender, receiver and eavesdropper as Alice, Bob, and
Eve, respectively. To set up a QKG system Alice and Bob
need a “quantum channel” between them where they can
send and receive, or share, quantum systems, e.g., “quantum
bits” (qubits). One example is an optical fibre carrying single
photons with the qubit coded in the photon’s polarization, but
there are many other possibilities. In a perfect channel every
qubit sent by Alice is received and correctly measured by
Bob, and Bob receives no qubits which Alice has not sent. In
practice, such channels don’t exist. A real-world channel can
lose almost all qubits in transit, make Bob think he received
qubits never sent by Alice and modify some of the qubits that
do go from Alice to Bob. But a perfect channel is not needed,
as long as the errors are within some limits QKG will still
produce a key that is both shared and secret [4], [9]–[14].
They will also need a classical communication channel. The
alternatives include but are not limited to the Internet, the same
optical fibre used above, and a network cable parallel to the
optical fibre. Often in this context a simplifying assumption is
used: that the classical channel can be eavesdropped on, but
not be modified by Eve. Unfortunately, unmodifiable channels
don’t exist in the real world, so message authentication must
be used to allow Alice and Bob to detect Eve’s modification
attempts. To be able to authenticate, Alice and Bob will need
a (small) shared secret key to start with.
The purpose of the QKG system is to use the two channels
and a small portion of the already shared key to generate new
key portion, larger than the one just used. The initial key only
needs to be large enough to allow for the first generation
sequence, typically to authenticate two messages, one from
Alice to Bob and one in the other direction. This will enable
the key to grow somewhat (QKG), and will allow for further
runs, in which the key will grow even more. A round consists
of a number of steps:
1) Raw key generation: Use the quantum channel to trans-
mit/generate a bit sequence, shared between Alice and
Bob but equal only in a portion of the positions. The size
of this portion depends on the protocol used, properties
of the channel, and whether Eve is listening on the
quantum channel.
2) Sifting: Remove most of the bits that do not match
by comparing parameters of each use of the quantum
channel, the “settings.” This will discard noisy bits
without sending any information about the value of
the bits on the classical channel. A smaller “sifted”
key is obtained which is equal at Alice and Bob in a
considerably larger portion, the size of which depends on
properties of the channel and whether Eve is listening.
3) Error correction, or key reconciliation [15]: Perform
error correction on the sifted key and estimate the error
rate to detect whether Eve was listening on the quantum
channel, either with a few sacrificed bits from the sifted
key, or with some of the sifted-out bits from the last
step, depending on details of the protocol. If the error
rate is above a pre-determined bound, Alice and Bob
conclude that Eve has been listening and the round must
be aborted.
SECURITY ASPECTS OF THE AUTHENTICATION USED IN QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 2
4) Privacy amplification [16]–[18]: If the noise is lower
than the predetermined bound, Eve may still have been
listening but in that case she has opted to only extract
very little information. In this case, Alice and Bob can
perform “privacy amplification” to lower Eve’s informa-
tion even further, sacrificing a few bits of their candidate
key in the process.
5) Authentication [19]–[21]: The final step of each round
is to authenticate the messages sent from Alice to Bob
and from Bob to Alice on the classical channel, to make
sure Eve has not modified these messages. The sender
uses key bits from the previously shared secret key to
create an authentication tag from the message. The used
key bits are then discarded. The tag is sent along with
the message and the recipient uses his copy of the key to
generate another tag from the received message. If the
tags are identical, the message is accepted as authentic
and the new key just generated is added to the remaining
key from the last round. If the authentication fails, Eve is
assumed to be trying to interfere and the round should
be aborted. (A complication is the fact that the error
correction is not perfect. An error can, with a small
probability, sneak through. If that error is in the key used
for authentication in a later round, the authentication will
fail even without Eve being present.)
There are variations in the details but all QKG protocols
contain these main steps. Eve’s presence is detected via
high error rate on the quantum channel in step 3 or failure
of authentication on the classical channel in step 5. If the
authentication step is not performed, all QKG protocols are
susceptible to a man-in-the-middle attack, where Eve would
impersonate Bob when communicating with Alice and vice
versa. Even when performing authentication, one broken round
will provide Eve with the authentication key for a subsequent
round and can break that too, and so on for all future rounds.
We will examine the authentication step of the protocols in
some more detail here and show that it is also sensitive to
choice of message to be authenticated.
II. AUTHENTICATION
In QKG, the standard is to use Wegman-Carter authenti-
cation [19]–[21]. This is the authentication equivalent of the
Vernam cipher (the one-time pad, see e.g. [22]), for which
all messages are equally likely if the key is unknown. In
Wegman-Carter authentication, all values of the tag are equally
likely if the key is unknown, and even if one message-tag
pair is known, all values of the tag corresponding to another
message still are (almost) equally likely. A tag is shorter than
a message, so in comparison, just guessing a tag will be more
likely to succeed than the corresponding guess of a message
in OTP. Nevertheless, given a sufficiently long tag length,
the probability of correctly guessing the tag will be very low
in Wegman-Carter authentication. That is, the probability of
generating the correct tag for a forged message will be very
low.
In the Vernam cipher, the required key needs to be at
least as long as the message to be encrypted. Fortunately, in
Wegman-Carter authentication, the required key grows only
logarithmically with the message length. This is essential for
QKG as it is then only a matter of making the rounds large
enough to gain more key than is lost in the authentication.
Formally, the fundamental building block of Wegman-Carter
authentication is called universal families of hash functions1, a
familyH of functions that map a message in the set of possible
messagesM to a tag in the set of tags T . The following formal
definition of the appropriate family of hash functions is taken
from [21]:
Definition 1: ǫ-almost strongly-universal2 (ǫ-ASU2)
hash functions
Let M and T be finite sets and call functions
from M to T hash functions. Let ǫ be a positive
real number. A set H of hash functions is ǫ-almost
strongly-universal2 if the following two conditions
are satisfied:
(a) The number of hash functions in H that takes
an arbitrary m1 ∈ M to an arbitrary t1 ∈ T is
exactly |H|/|T |.
(b) The fraction of those functions that also takes an
arbitrary m2 6= m1 in M to an arbitrary t2 ∈ T
(possibly equal to t1) is no more than ǫ.
The parameter ǫ controls a trade-off between the size of H
and the probability to guess the correct tag. The lower bound of
ǫ = 1/|T | can be achieved if a large family can be tolerated
and Wegman and Carter included several such examples in
[19]. Those families are too large to be usable in QKG, but
Wegman and Carter later showed [20] that by just doubling
the possibility of a correct guess, a much smaller 2/|T |-ASU2
family can be constructed. That family is small enough for
QKG, and although there are many other similar families, the
exact choice is not important and we will use their original
example from [20] below.
Put in formal language, the authentication proceeds as
follows. Alice and Bob share a secret key k just large enough
to select a hash function hk ∈ H, 0 ≤ k < |H|. Alice wants
Bob to have the message mA ∈ M and sends both mA and
tA = hk(mA). Bob verifies that tA really equals hk(mA) and
accepts the message as authentic if it does. The key k is then
discarded and never reused.
Let us now introduce Eve, who has control over the channel
between Alice and Bob and wants Bob to accept a faked
message mE ∈M. To her the secret key is a random variable
K uniform over its whole range 0 ≤ K < |H|. If the key is a
random variable, so is the tag for her message TE = hK(mE).
The first condition of Def. 1 says that if K is uniform over
its whole range, so is TE (see Fig. 1). Eve can take a guess,
but any guess t is correct only with the probability
P (TE = t) = 1/|T |. (1)
1A word of warning is perhaps appropriate regarding terminology, as
these hash functions are quite different from “cryptographically secure hash
functions” sometimes mentioned in connection with authentication. It is
impossible to construct unbreakable cryptographically secure hash functions
(see e.g. [23]). They have similarities and both deserve to be called hash
functions, but the individual hash functions of Wegman-Carter are not, and
need not be, cryptographically secure in the classical sense.
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Fig. 1. In Wegman-Carter authentication, a given message m organizes
the keys k into subsets that each map the message to one value of the tag
t = hk(m), and these subsets are of equal size (for an ǫ-ASU2 family of
hash functions). That is, to Eve, the key K is completely unknown (uniformly
distributed), and therefore so is the tag TE = hK(mE) for her message mE .
Eve may also wait until Alice tries to send an authenticated
message to Bob, pick up the message and the tag, and make
sure Bob never see them. With both mA and tA = hK(mA) at
her disposal she can, given enough computing power, rule out
all keys that do not match and be left with just 1/|T | of the
keys to guess from, see Fig. 2. However, the second condition
of Def. 1 says that even with this knowledge, any tag value
t guessed by Eve is correct (equal to the correct tag TE) for
her mE 6= mA (with K uniform over its whole range) at best
with the probability
P (TE = t | hK(mA) = tA) ≤ ǫ (2)
The parameter ǫ is clearly an upper limit on the probability
that Eve makes the right guess and manages to fool Bob into
accepting a fake message, at least if Eve knows nothing about
the key beforehand.
In fact, Wegman-Carter authentication is cryptographically
secure in the following way: the probability of Eve guessing
the tag value for her message mE does not depend on which
message mA Alice sends, as long as it is not equal to
Eve’s message mE . The probability is always less than ǫ,
independently of mA, or put in other words, there are no
message-tag pairs from Alice that are significantly weaker than
others. Even if Eve was allowed to choose mA (different from
mE) and was given the tag for that message, she would not be
in an improved situation as regards the tag TE corresponding
to her message mE . This may not seem important at this point,
but will prove to be interesting later.
If Eve tries to break the authentication in the above scenario
and fails, her presence will be detected and the QKG round
will be aborted. A complicating factor is that the authentication
can fail from time to time without Eve because of channel
noise, so Eve can try to break the authentication but to
avoid raising suspicion she should only do this seldom. The
parameter ǫ should be chosen so that even if Eve does this,
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Fig. 2. In Wegman-Carter authentication, a given message-tag pair corre-
sponds to one subset of keys that map the message onto that tag value. A
different message induces a different family of subsets, and will spread out the
remaining keys so that all tag values have a probability less than or equal to
ǫ (for an ǫ-ASU2 family of hash functions, if the keys are equally probable).
Bob’s needs. For the 2/|T |-ASU2 family from [20], a 32-bit
tag would give a probability of 2−31 to generate the correct
tag after having seen a message-tag pair. On average, Eve
would need 231 ≈ 2.1 × 109 attempts. If one extra failure of
the authentication, e.g., every ten seconds is not detectable, it
would take on average 680 years to guess the correct tag. This
would be long enough for most uses.
III. PARTIALLY KNOWN KEY
Above, we have assumed that Eve has no information on
the secret key used in the authentication, i.e., to Eve the key K
was a random variable uniform over its whole range. This is
an unrealistic requirement in QKG. Information leakage in the
quantum transmission phase is unavoidable but the damage can
be reduced by using privacy amplification, which will reduce
Eve’s knowledge of the key significantly, but not all the way
to nothing. As soon as the whole pre-shared key is used Alice
and Bob will have to start trusting authentication with a key
that is not completely secret.
If Eve has some information on the key, but has not seen
any message-tag pair (as depicted in Fig. 3), an upper bound
for the chance that Eve’s generated, or guessed, tag value t
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(b) The distribution can be very skew, for instance if Eve holds information
that allows her to rule out some keys entirely.
Fig. 3. Eve’s information on the key will induce a nonuniform distribution
on k, and also on t.
is correct is the sum of probabilities for the |H|/|T | most




− log2 P (K = k)
)
, (3)
provides a somewhat looser but simpler bound given by




corresponding to the extreme case for which the |H|/|T | most
probable keys have equal probability. If Eve knows nothing
about the key her key (min-)entropy equals the size of the key
and the probability is (bounded by) 1/|T | as expected. If Eve
has only little knowledge, there is only a little increase in her
probability of guessing the correct tag for her message.
However, this changes radically in the case where Eve has
a little knowledge on the key and picks up a message-tag pair
(see Fig. 4). She again gains additional information that may
increase her knowledge about the key, but this increase is not


























Fig. 4. If Eve can rule out certain keys with her very limited information,
it may happen that Alice’s message-tag pair allows Eve to rule out all keys
except for a few that all map her message to the same tag. She can now send
her message and that tag, knowing that Bob will accept it. There is no risk
whatsoever that Bob will detect her.
for her mE 6= mA with the probability
P (TE = t | hK(mA) = tA) ≤ 1 (5)
There is no longer any bound on this probability. This is
because, with information about the key, K is no longer
uniformly distributed (to Eve).
In this situation, Eve has previous knowledge about which
values of the key that are possible. Here, this knowledge is
obtained from earlier rounds of the QKG protocol, in our
example in Fig. 4 is in the form of a list of keys that she
can rule out from the |H| possible keys:
HE = H \ {h1, . . . , hn}. (6)
In addition, the message-tag pair mA + tA that Eve receives
from Alice identifies a subset of keys (hash functions) of size
|H|/|T | from which the key must have been drawn:
HA = {h ∈ H : h(mA) = tA}. (7)
Given that the set of possible keys is HE rather than H, the
final set of possible keys is not HA but
HAE = HA ∩HE (8)
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If only one key remains in this subset, Eve will know which
key was drawn. In this case she can simply create a tag using
the identified key.
But it is also possible to use the result if more than one key
is present in HAE . More specifically, when
|HAE | ≤ ǫ|H|/|T |, (9)
there may exist messages m that are such that
∀h1, h2 ∈ HAE , h1(m) = h2(m). (10)
That is, for this message, all remaining keys map to the same
tag. The maximum number ǫ|H|/|T | is given in requirement
(b) in Def. 1. The number of messages with this property will
increase as |HAE | decreases from ǫ|H|/|T |. If one of these
messages coincides with mE , Eve can successfully break the
authentication. She may not know exactly which key k was
drawn but she knows enough to create the correct tag tE =
hk(mE) for her message. Even when her preferred message
mE does not coincide with one of the above messages, Eve
has some freedom in choosing mE and may be able to adjust
her message so that she can use the above technique. We will
from here on assume that this is the case: that Eve can choose
her message mE so that she can generate the correct tag tE
for it as soon as ineq. (9) holds.
The net result is that Eve has information at hand that
enables her to determine whether her attack will be successful.
In short: Eve can choose to tap the quantum channel in such a
way that the disturbance is below the noise limit set by Alice
and Bob. Her aim is not to use the information she gathers
to decode messages sent with the generated key, but to break
the authentication of the QKG system. She then intercepts
each message-tag pair sent by Alice and uses the additional
information provided by the pair to determine the tag for
her forged message. She will only be successful occasionally,
when
1) the message mA sent by Alice is such that at least one of
the subsets depicted in Fig. 4 contain less than ǫ|H|/|T |
keys, and
2) the key, randomly drawn to Eve, ends up in such a
subset.
Because Eve can determine when the attack is successful,
i.e., when the remaining keys all map her message to the
same tag, she will only replace Alices message-tag pair on the
classical channel when she is certain of success. As long as
Eve stays passive she does not risk detection, and she actively
replaces the message-tag pair only when her tag is correct.
This attack is possible to perform each round, instead of the
sparse attempts that the previosly mentioned guessing strategy
allowed.
In what follows, to simplify the analysis, we will assume
that Eve performs the active replacement only when she is
certain of success, even though this is not strictly necessary.
Eve can calculate the probability of success from similar
considerations as used above, even when it is less than one.
It would be possible to devise a more complicated guessing
strategy to be used by Eve in this case, but that is beyond the
scope of this paper.
IV. SECURITY?
Let us assess the severity of this threat by estimating the
probability that Eve receives the right message-tag pair given
only a little information on the key. We will assume that Eve
uses all her information to eliminate (1 − r)|H| keys (with
r ≤ 1, see Fig. 3(b)), and thus that the true key to her is
drawn from the remaining r|H| = |HE | keys with equal
probability. This assumption simplifies our calculations but
is not really essential. The question is now how many keys
remain in HAE = HA ∩ HE after receiving a message-tag
pair from Alice.
First, we will also assume that Eve can do nothing more than
remove keys essentially at random with her initial knowledge
of the key. The message-tag pair that Eve receives corresponds
to drawing |H|/|T | keys from H without returning them. The
true key will always be present in the drawn keys (and is of
course one of the remaining, possible keys), while the other
|H|/|T |−1 keys are drawn from |H|−1 keys of which r|H|−
1 are “possible”, i.e., belong to HE . The number of drawn
possible keys X is a random variable, and removing the true
key, the random variable (X − 1) will be hypergeometrically
distributed:





















|H|/|T | − 1
) . (12)
The interesting case is when the number of keys drawn is less



















|H|/|T | − 1
) .
(13)
This probability is complicated to evaluate but can be
estimated using the Chebyshev inequality2
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2It can be noted that the Chebyshev inequality is rather loose, but it is
generally valid and will be sufficient for our purposes here.
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This simplifies considerably in the asymptotic regime
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In practice, the right-hand constant is very small. The 2/|T |-
ASU2 hash family from [20] is of size
|H| = |T |4 log log |M|, (22)
e.g., for a 100 kbit message and a 32 bit tag, this translates to
|H| ≈ 232×4×17 = 22176, (23)
i.e., roughly 2 kbit of key used. If Eve is allowed to have,
e.g., 1/8 bit initial knowledge of the key (so that r ≈ 0.917),
her chance to break the system without fearing detection is
less than 3.5 × 10−647 each round. At 1000 rounds/s, Eve’s
expected time to break the system would be at least 10635
years, much longer than when just guessing once every ten
seconds. Remember that using this approach, Eve does not
guess the tag value but only tries to break the system when she
is certain of success. This result is the same as in [24]; even if
Eve has a little information on the key used for authentication,
her chances at breaking the authentication does not increase
substantially. However, Eve can do more than just wait for the
right message-tag pair to arrive; she may have a cunning plan.
V. A POSSIBLE ATTACK
Eve’s main obstacle above is the Chebyshev inequality.
Viewed in another manner, the central limit theorem ensures
that most of the subsets will, with high probability, contain a
number of remaining keys very close to r|H|/|T | ≫ ǫ|H|/|T |.
Eve’s chances of breaking the authentication would increase
dramatically if the remaining keys were split into subsets of
only two kinds: with either ǫ|H|/|T | or |H|/|T | keys in each
subset. This will change the probability distribution discussed
above, so that the argument that used the Chebyshev inequality
does not apply anymore. Eve would then be able to break the
authentication if the correct key would happen to fall in a
subset with ǫ|H|/|T | remaining keys, since we assume that
Eve has enough freedom to generate a message-tag pair of
her own as soon as this happens.
There are a few methods that Eve could use to arrange
the subsets to her liking, but the easiest method would be to
change the message: the message from Alice to Bob contains
a lot of data that describes what has happened on the quantum
channel. And Eve can access and change what happens on the
quantum channel. In essence, Eve has some influence on the
content of the message that Alice sends, and as a consequence,
Eve can change the subsets. Note that this attack would use a
different type of changes on the quantum channel than those
caused by Eve extracting information from it, and need not
be detectable as an increased noise level in the reconciliation
step of the protocol. The attack is different in its aim since it
is not intended to increase Eve’s information on the key, but
rather to maximize the usefulness of the information she has
obtained in a previous round. Assuming that Eve does this
as best as she can, the subsets may well be such that there
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Fig. 5. Eve may be able to influence the message from Alice to arrange
for subsets of two kinds, either with ǫ|H|/|T | remaining key values (on the
left in the figure) or |H|/|T | remaining key values (on the right), to have as
many subsets as possible with ǫ|H|/|T | remaining key values.
In this situation, the probability of success is instead the
probability that the correct key ends up in one of the subsets





























The change in probability distribution gives a dramatic in-
crease in probability from the bound in ineq. (21) to the value
in eqn. (25). The difference between |T |/|H| and ǫ/(1 − ǫ)














In our example, using a 2/|T |-ASU2 hash family, a 32 bit tag
and 1/8 bit initial knowledge of the key (so that r ≈ 0.9170),
the probability of success is ≈ 4.2 ∗ 10−11. Again, at 1000
rounds/s, Eve’s expected time to break the system would
be just nine months. Yes, read that again. Nine months to
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break a QKG system without risk of detection. The immense
difference between the two expected times above suggests that
this is a problem even when Eve is not able to obtain the ideal
subsets.
The real theoretical reason for the existence of this attack
is that Wegman-Carter authentication with a partially known
key is not cryptographically secure in the way discussed in
Section II, concerning Wegman-Carter authentication with a
completely secret key. Here, the probability of Eve guessing
the tag value for her message mE does depend on which
message mA Alice sends (even when it is not equal to Eve’s
message mE). Put in other words, there are message-tag pairs
from Alice that are weaker than others. In QKG, Eve can
influence mA via the quantum channel and is given the tag
for that message, and this will improve her situation as regards
the determination of the correct tag tE corresponding to her
message mE .
It is clear that simply sending the tag along with the message
to prove authenticity does not work in the long run if Eve has
a small but non-zero knowledge of the authentication key used
and can influence the message Alice wants to send. The little
information carried by the tag can be enough together with
what Eve already has, to make Eve certain that her attack will
be successful. The probability of this happening in a run is
small but Eve can wait, not trying to break the authentication
until she is sure of success.
VI. PREVENTION
To prevent Eve from breaking the QKG system, Alice
and Bob may adjust the parameter choices of |T | by using
a larger tag, or r by requiring more privacy amplification.
This to make the expected time-of-life of the system long
enough to suit their taste, but this will use up more key in
the authentication, and/or require them to sacrifice more key
during privacy amplification. The key production rate of such
a system will be lowered, and given the meager output of the
systems used today, this is probably not desirable. Minimizing
this effect would require a detailed analysis of each individual
QKG protocol.
A simpler, more efficient and generic fix would be to delay
the second transfer of information to Eve so that she has to
make the decision to try to break the authentication before she
knows if she will succeed, i.e., before she has received the tag.
The most obvious way to do this is to force Eve to send the
message (Alice’s or her own) to Bob before she gets hold of
the tag.
One solution is using synchronized clocks and sending
messages and tags at pre-agreed times, with a pause longer
than the precisions of the clocks. Synchronized clocks are
already recommended for other security purposes in present
QKG systems [11].
Another solution that does not need clocks is for Alice to
send the message to Bob, who replies with a large random
number never seen by Eve or used before, a salt. Alice
calculates a tag based on the concatenation of the message and
the salt and sends that tag to Bob. Before Eve has seen the tag
she will not know if she will be able to forge a message/salt/tag
triplet, and she will not see the tag before she sends a salt to
Alice. Eve can either send the real message to Bob and fail but
stay undetected or send Alice a faked salt and/or Bob a faked
message. In the latter case, with the above parameter choices,
it is almost certain that the tag she receives from Alice won’t
give the appropriate additional information, which reduces this
attack to the simple guessing strategy initially described above.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
To conclude, even though Wegman-Carter authentication
seems secure when used with a partially known key [24],
the usual implementation of a QKG system contains an
additional subtlety. Eve can influence the message to be sent,
and together with partial knowledge of the key, this opens
up Eve’s possibilities. Fortunately a simple remedy exists:
force Eve to make her attack before she knows that it will
succeed, by making sure Alice will not send the authentication
tag until either Bob has received the message or Eve has
attempted breaking the system. A real-world implementation
of a QKG system might already have similar properties since
a) the messages in question are to a large extent composed of
random bitsequences, and b) a round normally consists of a
dialogue of several messages and an authentication tag for
all of them at the very end of the round. Whether this is
enough to keep the system secure depends on the details of
the system, but implementing the solution proposed here is
cheap and requires no deep analysis of the system. We would
therefore recommend doing just that in future QKG systems.
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